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And it was thou who on the boldest heel
Stood up and flung the span on even wing
Of that great Bridge, our Myth, whereof I sing!
-Hart Crane1
I. NOMOS AND NATURE
In several of his last essays, Bob Cover sets out a view of human nature
that is equally intended as a view of "the nature of law."2 In this view,
law is not an incidental means to the realization of our desires, but a
structure of our striving itself. "Law is the projection of an imagined fu-
ture upon reality."3 To capture this temporal ontology of law, this con-
ception of existence that places law at the center of our efforts "to build
future worlds,"4 Bob makes use of the word "nomos."5
Nomos means life lived in a gap between desire and fulfillment, present
and future: a gap which it is "the nature of law" to span. Nomos and
Narrative develops this conception of law in terms of symbol and narra-
tive. Law as gap-spanner is conceived in the symbol of the bridge; narra-
tive is the stuff of which the bridge is made. "I have argued not only that
the nature of law is a bridge to the future, but also that each community
builds its bridges [wi]th the materials of sacred narrative. . . . The com-
f Professor of Law and Religion, University of Southern California. I am grateful to Mordecai
Finley, Judi Resnik, Stephen Morse, Owen Fiss, and the staff of the Yale Law Journal for their
thoughtful help.
1. H. CRANE, The Bridge, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND SELECrED LmTTERs AND PROSE OF
HART CRANE 94 (B. Weber ed. 1966) [hereinafter The Bridge].
2. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REv. 179, 182 (1985)
[hereinafter Folktales of Justice].
3. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604 (1986) [hereinafter Violence and the
Word].
4. Id. at 1602 n.2.
5. The idea of nomos enjoys in Bob's writing somewhat the same status as the idea of "existence"
in the writings of Kierkegaard or Sartre. Both nomos and existence are views of human life or of the
human situation; further, nomos and existence both view human life from the vantage point of com-
mitment, struggle, and moral (or trans-moral) seriousness. Whether existence and nomos carry differ-
ences in substance and emphasis-the one stressing consciousness, personhood, and freedom, the other
action, communality, and obligation-raises questions too complex to discuss here.
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mitments that are the material of our bridges to the future are learned
and expressed through sacred stories. "6
Because nomos is a conception both of law and of human nature, it is
plausible to think of it as providing the basis for a theory of natural law.7
Such a theory would seek the justification of laws in their fidelity to the
human situation, and the lawful situation, that nomos names. While Bob
discussed natural law at great length in Justice Accused,8 his earlier work
on the jurisprudence of slavery and antislavery, he does not make much
use of the phrase in his later essays. In a key passage in Nomos and
Narrative, however, he suggests that "[i]t is possible to conceive of a natu-
ral law of jurisdiction that might supplant the positivist version."9 The
latter confirms "the triumph of the hierarchical order over meaning,"
while the former offers "the judge's only hope of partially extricating
himself from the violence of the state." 10
In Nomos and again in a later essay, The Folktales ofJustice, Bob links
this "natural law of jurisdiction" to the normative hermeneutics of story-
telling: to "narratives of judicial resistance," "sacred narratives of jurisdic-
tion that might constitute the texts to ground judicial commitments.""1 In
what way do narratives ground judicial commitments? What is the rela-
tion between the ideas of nomos, natural law, symbol, and narrative?
For Bob, stories and symbols constitute a form of ethical naturalism.
They provide a meaning for the idea of nature, and for the moral con-
cepts-human nature, the nature of law, natural law-that depend on
6. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 182.
7. By "natural law," I understand a human-nature naturalist theory of law. Such a theory con-
tends that there is a human nature, that this nature is knowable, and that it is the mission of law to
realize this nature or to forestall the evil that inheres in it. Natural law thus defined is not coextensive
with moral realism, or even with realism conceived naturalistically. Natural law is a special form of
ethical naturalism for two reasons. Its naturalism consists of claims about human nature; and those
claims culminate in a thesis about the purpose or function of law.
8. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) [hereinafter JUSTICE ACCUSED].
9. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L.
REV. 4, 58 (1983) [hereinafter Nomos and Narrative].
10. The "natural law of jurisdiction," as I understand it, would help judges to set reliable fron-
tiers for their moral and legal daring. It would tell judges how greatly to dare in asserting the right
and the obligation to declare the law and to enforce it upon the bodies of criminals, armies, and kings.
Whether Bob meant to draw a sharp distinction between the assertion of jurisdiction and the declara-
tion of the substantive law, and to restrict natural law justifications to the former, I do not know. Id.
at 58, 59. While the "natural law of jurisdiction" thus defined is specially responsive to the require-
ments of judging, I take the idea to have a wider application to problems of commitment and forbear-
ance. Communities and social movements might look to the natural law of jurisdiction whenever they
face choices between submission and assertive intervention, obedience and disobedience. In its broadest
sense-when jurisdiction becomes synonymous with authenticity-the natural law of jurisdiction be-
comes a body of wisdom, developed by reflection upon our shared nature or condition, to which we
ought to turn when we consider how far it falls to us to shape the possibilities and limits of our
common lives. To this end we recall the moods of resolve: not only Luther's "Here I stand, I can do
no other," but also Jesus' "My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as
I will, but as thou wilt." Matthew 26:39 (Revised Standard Version).
11. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 183.
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that idea. Nature employed in this way-as "a term of distinction," as
Leo Strauss called itx2-is at once normative and descriptive. More pre-
cisely, to say that nature has the authority to guide our action is to root
what we fundamentally ought to be and do in the ground of what we
fundamentally are. Thus, ethical naturalism requires an integration of the
"is" and the "ought." Bob said:
To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the
precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states of
affairs. It requires that one integrate not only the "is" and the
"ought," but the "is," the "ought," and the "what might be." Narra-
tive so integrates these domains. 3
Injustice Accused, Bob first recognized that natural law affords a way
of expressing and responding to the human and legal condition of being
caught between two worlds: the worlds from which and to which our
desires and imaginations spring. "In the natural law tradition on slavery,"
according to Justice Accused,
the judge inherited a device for expressing the gap between the law
as it is and the law as it ought to be. The words, themselves, had
been used variously over the centuries: sometimes to articulate the
necessary imperfection of human institutions; sometimes as a theory
of origins; often as a quest for what ought to be.14
These various words clearly mattered less, in Bob's eyes, than the under-
lying belief that the judge lives and works precisely in "the gap between
the law as it is and the law as it ought to be."
This concept of the gap-the space between is and ought-was the seed
that grew into what Bob later called nomos, "a present world constituted
by a system of tension between reality and vision."15 And it was the initial
awareness of the gap that led Bob ultimately to regard law as a bridge.
"Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept
of a reality to an imagined alternative-that is, as a connective between
two states of affairs, both of which can be represented in their normative
significance only through the devices of narrative." 6
When he wrote Justice Accused, Bob perhaps thought that natural law
could recognize and express this gap in ways that "a static and simplistic
model of law," in which the judge is caught "between the demands of role
12. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 82 (1953).
13. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 10.
14. JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 8, at 29.
15. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 9.
16. Id.
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and the voice of conscience," could not.1" "[I]n a dynamic model, law is
always becoming. And the judge has a legitimate role in determining what
it is that the law will become." 18
At the same time, Bob recognized that
the philosophical attacks on natural law are quite important. For,
just as the new American judiciary was about to begin its struggle
with slave law, the viability of the common heritage for expressing
the gap between law as it is and law as it should be, was under fire.
As a result, judicial recourse to "natural law," which had its legiti-
mate though limited role, was to sound less and less like an appeal to
commonly accepted sources for principle and more and more like a
party slogan. For Hume and Bentham had laid the foundation for
rejecting any such appeal on the ground that, meaningless in itself,
nature could signify whatever the speaker wanted it to.' 9
If nature is "meaningless in itself," how can it "signify"? It was to the
"devices of narrative," and to the symbol of the bridge, that Bob looked
for an answer to this central philosophical question about natural law. To
understand nature as a term of moral distinction, and to understand natu-
ral law in a way that would take seriously the difference between modern
and ancient views of the philosophical role of nature, Bob called upon the
categories of normative hermeneutics: narrative, symbol, folktale, myth.
These categories would help us to understand our existence in the gap
between is and ought, present and future; they would help us to "bridge"
that gap. In the course of describing our existence, this normative herme-
neutic conception of nature becomes a view of human nature. In the
course of associating that view of human nature with a claim that the
"bridge" is law, the narratival conception of nature becomes a view of
natural law.
II. A TRANSFORMATIONAL CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE
Transformation is the central term in Bob's understanding of human
nature and law. In Nomos and Narrative, he says that "[liaw is that
which licenses in blood certain transformations while authorizing others
only by unanimous consent."2 Bob goes on to say that "[n]arratives are
models through which we study and experience transformations that re-
sult when a given simplified state of affairs is made to pass through the
17. JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 8, at 6.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 29-30.
20. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 9.
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force field of a similarly simplified set of norms."'" Bob insists that we not
lose sight of our readiness to back law with coercive violence that "licenses
in blood certain transformations;" but he equally insists that this "impe-
rial" aspect of legal transformation is subordinate to the "paideic" or
"world-creating" aspect "in which law is predominantly a system of
meaning rather than an imposition of force."'22
World-creation is at the heart of Bob's notion of transformation. It is
embodied in his concept of "jurisgenesis" or law-creation. The creation of
law by "strong" forces or "strong" communities is a kind of world-
creation: a Genesis. Bob said in an unfinished essay, Bringing the Mes-
siah Through Law, "I have set forth a view of law which sees the essen-
tial law-creating act as requiring creation of strong worlds by strong com-
munities with attendant commitments to realize those worlds over time."'23
Bob intended his conception of law as nomos to invite us to participate in
such strong communities, and thereby to share in the cosmogony that is
jurisgenesis. "We ought to stop circumscribing the nomos," he concluded
in Nomos and Narrative. "We ought to invite new worlds." '
While Bob did use the word "teleology" to describe his view of law, it
did not mean for him what it has meant in classical systems of natural
law. By teleology, Bob did not denote natural ends whose realization con-
stitutes the good life. Nor did Bob mean by legal teleology an inherent
principle of legal progress toward the attainment of such a life. Instead,
Bob thought of law's teleology as its inherent role in the creation and
testing of new worlds:
I think I am making a strong claim here for the teleology implicit in
law and for what is entailed in that teleology: namely a generative
capacity through which law not only generates new law but also is
at least linked to-if it is not determinative of-the generation of
new concepts of the worlds we strive to realize.25
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 12-13. It is not clear to what extent Bob regarded the connection between violence and
legal meaning as contingent upon the social organization of law. While it may be possible to associate
the paideic aspect of law with relatively small communal groups, and the imperial aspect with the
state, I do not understand Bob to be claiming that legal meaning would somehow be less associated
with violence if the communal groups took a more active role in law-making and law-finding. The
connection between violence and legal meaning is internal to "the nature of law," not dependent upon
alternative constitutional arrangements. The concept of commitment touches upon this internal rela-
tionship. Yet I do not understand Bob to be asserting that commitment in general, or commitment to
legal meanings in particular, is necessarily violent in any strong sense. In this as in other respects, see
supra note 5, the ideas of nomos and existence approach one another without, perhaps, finally agree-
ing in their estimate of human moral life.
23. Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through Law: A Case Study, in NoMos XXX: RELIGION,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW (R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. forthcoming 1988) [hereinafter
Messiah].
24. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 68.
25. Messiah, supra note 23.
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Thus it is in the nature of law to be "generative"-jurisgenerative, cosmo-
gonic, world-creating.
In calling law "nomos," Bob associated law with cosmos, or a meaning-
ful order.26 The epigraph that opens Nomos and Narrative, lines from
Wallace Stevens' Connoisseur of Chaos,27 suggests that Bob conceived of
nomos in the light of the recurrent mythic theme that pits a cosmos of
meaningful order against a chaos of meaningless violence and disorder.
The inherent principle of order in law, as Bob understood it, is not the
kind of order that one might find in a teleological conception of the psyche
or polis, or in a well-rationalized body of rules. Instead, it is the order of
a cosmos, a source and residue of creative acts: in short, an order only in
the sense in which "[a] great disorder is an order."'28 Cosmos suggests the
kind of order appropriate to law's involvement in transformation, con-
ceived as the creation of and experimentation with worlds of meaning.
The opening words of Nomos and Narrative-"We inhabit a no-
mos-a normative universe" 2 -situate humankind within this cosmos.
They convey a view of human nature that takes our definitive characteris-
tic to be our participation in the cosmogony: the fact that "[w]e constantly
create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful,
of valid and void."30 The nomos is "our world.""1 To define us in that
world Bob used the words of Clifford Geertz: "[M]an is an animal sus-
pended in webs of significance he himself has spun."3 2
This passage from Geertz, and certain others from Peter Berger, which
Cover quotes with apparent approval,33 express a view of the human life-
world that is characteristic of many modern writers. According to this
view, what makes us human is our capacity to create and inhabit worlds
of meaning, and to transform these worlds through personal, communal,
and social action. Is this rather popular account of human life a "theory
of human nature"? Or is it the reverse: an account of human life that
insists precisely that we have no nature?
In some sense, surely, we are free to characterize this vision in either of
these two ways. If "human nature" means a situation or condition com-
26. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 4; accord id. at 4 n.2 (tracing his conception of
nomos to ideas of "world-building" and "meaningful order" as they have been developed in sociology
of knowledge, especially in work of Peter Berger).
27. "A. A violent order is disorder; and / B. A great disorder is an order. These / Two things are
one." Id. at 4 (quoting W. STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WAL-




31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 5 n.7 (quoting C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973)).
33. See supra note 26.
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mon to human cultures, and if the generation and transformation of
meanings is this condition, then that situation or condition is our human
nature. If "human nature" means ethical ideas that are valid because uni-
versally embraced, or ends that are somehow built into our constitution
and prior to our acts of inquiry and expression, then the Cover-Geertz-
Berger account is not a theory of human nature, but a theory that suggests
that we have no nature.
As I understand Bob's concept of nomos, its point is not to enlist on
either side of this rather simplistic war over the existence of a human
nature. Instead, its point is to help us to reshape the meaning of nature
itself. To see this aspect of Bob's work, it will be necessary to recall the
distinction that classical Greek philosophy drew between nomos and
physis.34
In Aristotle, the term "natural law" would be an oxymoron. Nomos
meant law in the sense of the conventions or customs that prevail in the
different cities and cultures, and that therefore change from place to place
and from time to time. In that sense, law was not natural but conven-
tional. What could be natural was not nomos but dike (dikaiosyne, to
dikaion): justice, righteousness, the right. To say that justice was natural,
physei, meant that it was everywhere and at all times unchangeable, that
it always served as the end that draws us to our highest and most com-
plete flourishing. If, in calling our human law-world nomos, Bob meant
to call up the classical distinction between nomos and physis, then it
would be fair to say that Bob saw nomos not as a kind of nature but
instead as an alternative to nature.
According to this reading, nomos is convention, and Bob's theory of law
and of the human situation is a kind of conventionalism. The jurisgenera-
tive groups are the various cultures that, as Aristotle knew, make their
own customs and ways."5 From this view, Bob's attack against the state's
claim to a monopoly on law is based on a kind of logical error, the typical
error of the relativist who espouses tolerance. For the conventionalist has
no way of arguing that the state's seizure of the means of law-making is
really wrong. To say that the state's imperial legal violence is wrong on a
conventionalist account of meaning and truth is just to say that it violates
the shared values of certain communities.
But this identification of Bob's nomos with conventionalism is mistaken.
In calling the law-world nomos, as we have seen, Bob meant to oppose
nomos not to physis but to chaos. Whereas nomos, as the opposite of
34. See L. STRAUSS, supra note 12, at 81-164; Von Fritz & Kapp, The Development of Aris-
totle's Political Philosophy and the Idea of Nature, in ETHICS AND POLITICS 117 (J. Barnes, M.
Schofield & R. Sorabji eds. 1977).
35. 7 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS §§ 1134b18-1135a5.
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physis, is convention, nomos, as the opposite of chaos, is cosmos, or mean-
ingful created order. And cosmos, as the created order, is in fact a kind of
nature. Indeed, the idea of cosmos may even be said to be the definitive
conception of nature for the civilizations influenced by Biblical religion.
Of course, in saying this, I do not mean to underestimate the difficulties
that lie in the way of a truly satisfying account of cosmos as a view of
nature that supports and makes sense out of ethical naturalism."8 I simply
want to point out that for Bob, nomos as cosmos was a kind of nature,
rather than an acceptance of the classical binary opposition between na-
ture and convention. Probably the best view to take of Bob's later work is
that Bob did not find the classical distinction between nature and conven-
tion to be a helpful way of thinking about the human life-world and law-
world.
Once Bob's concept of nomos is extricated from conventionalism, his
attack against statist conceptions of law no longer looks like the illogical
claim that the abundance of differing conventions entails a diffusion of
jurisdiction, or of jurisgenerative authority. Instead, the critique of impe-
rial or statist law flows directly from Bob's assessment of our human con-
dition. When the state monopolizes law, as it does in what Bob called the
positivist theory of jurisdiction, it affirms precisely "the triumph of the
hierarchical order over meaning."'3 7 It acts inconsistently with our actual
constitution as meaning-creators and meaning-inhabitants, and thus cir-
cumscribes the nomos. Bob's claim is that we cannot flourish as meaning-
generative beings when we surrender to the state our participation in the
cosmogonic and jurisgenerative processes.
III. LAW AS A BRIDGE
To specify more precisely the contours of his transformative conception
of human nature and law, Bob called upon the ancient idea that our
human efforts and understandings are in some way situated within or
between two worlds: between memory and desire, fall and redemption,
earth and heaven, this world and "the other world." The task, then, be-
came one of defining or describing these two worlds, and of specifying the
relation between them that is characteristic of human nature and law. To
help him in this task, Bob drew upon two devices that we might loosely
regard as literary: the image or symbol of law as a bridge, and the notion
of narrative or story. "Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a
bridge linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative-that is, as
36. For an extended discussion, see Garet, Natural Law and Creation Stories, in NoMos XXX:
RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW, supra note 23.
37. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 58.
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a connective between two states of affairs, both of which can be repre-
sented in their normative significance only through the devices of narra-
tive.""8 "I have argued not only that the nature of law is a bridge to the
future, but also that each community builds its bridges [wi]th the materi-
als of sacred narrative." 9 "The commitments that are the material of our
bridges to the future are learned and expressed through sacred stories."4
But what is the nature of this link, connection, or bridge; and what is
bridged?
A nomos, as a world of law, entails the application of human will to
an extant state of affairs as well as toward our visions of alternative
futures. A nomos is a present world constituted by a system of ten-
sion between reality and vision.
Our visions hold our reality up to us as unredeemed. By them-
selves the alternative worlds of our visions-the lion lying down with
the lamb, the creditor forgiving debts each seventh year, the state all
shriveled and withered away-dictate no particular set of transfor-
mations or efforts at transformation. But law gives a vision depth of
field, by placing one part of it in the highlight of insistent and imme-
diate demand while casting another part in the shadow of the millen-
nium. Law is that which licenses in blood certain transformations
while authorizing others only by unanimous consent. Law is a force,
like gravity, through which our worlds exercise an influence upon
one another, a force that affects the courses of these worlds through
normative space. And law is that which holds our reality apart from
our visions and rescues us from the eschatology that is the collision
in this material social world of the constructions of our minds.4
In Bringing the Messiah Through Law, Bob retained his "two-worlds"
conception and his image or symbol of the bridge as the link between
those worlds that is constitutive of human nature and law.
Law is a bridge in normative space. It connects the worlds we have
to a world we can imagine. But there are many possible worlds and
many ways to connect them. Not all these futures-not all the
bridges to them-can plausibly be called "law". ...
I, thus, had in mind an idea that law bridged two "moving
worlds." The normative world we have is a changing or moving one.
Our concept of our normative selves and environment is in flux. But,
as our concept of where we are (normatively) changes so does our
concept of the possible world to which our law impels us to go. A
38. Id. at 9.
39. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 182.
40. Id.
41. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 9-10.
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world with "law" is a world in which (a) There are particular
processes (bridges) for getting to the future; (b) The[rie are particu-
lar kind[s] of futures that one can get to[;] (c) There are always
[new] future worlds that are held over against our current normative
world with an implicit demand that they be striven towards.42
Bob's emphasis upon the "changing or moving" character of our present
normative world, and of the possible futures indicated by law's aims, re-
states his account of human nature as a transformative process. What the
"two worlds" concept, and the symbol of the bridge, add to this account is
the idea that the transformative process is a "system of tension"; the fu-
ture worlds are "held over against our current normative world." Law in
fact "holds our reality apart from our visions"; it preserves rather than
abolishes the "over-againstness" of our condition.
If law is a bridge, then, it is clearly a strange sort of bridge: one that
does not simply remove an obstacle to movement, or permit us to move
freely from one shore to another, but instead serves precisely to hold the
shores apart, and to preserve "tension" between them. Here Bob departs
sharply from certain common assumptions about the internal values of
law. In the prevailing climate of instrumentalism, the inner rationality of
law and the value that inheres in that rationality are conceived as a cer-
tain relation of means and ends. Animated by his vision of nomos, of
meaning-creation in the gap between present and future worlds, Bob
reconceived the inner rationality of law as a certain relation of meaning
and ending. On the former view, law satisfies its own internal values
when it achieves a tolerable degree of fit between the ends sought and the
means employed."3 On the latter view, law sets itself a quite different
requirement. It must allow in just enough "ending" to render the acts of
law-creation and law-commitment meaningful to lawyers, judges, and
jurisgenerative groups, but not so much "ending" as to annul the tension
between reality and vision that sustains law's work.
One purpose of the unfinished Messiah essay was to explore the strange
tension of the law-bridge.
Elsewhere [i.e., in Nomos and Narrative] in trying to evoke the pe-
culiarities of law as a bridge to the future, I wrote, with an excess of
metaphoric rhetoric, that "law is that which holds our reality apart
from our visions and rescues us from the eschatology that is the colli-
sion in this material world of the constructions of our minds."
The idea that a particular "bridge" with its implicit teleologies be
42. Messiah, supra note 23.
43. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
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a product of "law" seemed to me to be inconsistent-in a loose
way-with apocalyptic eschatologies. I would have supposed-I did
suppose-that Messianism in its customary apocalyptic form was the
antithesis of lawful transformation. I suppose, in writing the above
quoted passage, I accepted the notion that Messianism typically had
an anti-nomian cast to it. Since I then chose, and continue to
choose[,] to treat the juxtaposition of implicit alternative futures to
current concepts of reality as central to the idea of law, the immedi-
acy of the end of days [like Revolutionary transformations], seemed
inevitably to tend to undermine the "normal" tension between pre-
sent and future, that which is real and that which is to be realized.
Thus, I concluded, elliptically, that law "rescues us from ...
eschatology." '44
Bob goes on to acknowledge "the obvious fallacies in this line of reason-
ing,"'45 and to admit that efforts to realize the future ideal world through
heroic legal action-or "lawful Messianism"4 6-do not necessarily "tend
to undermine the 'normal' tension between present and future." "A lawful
Messianism," Bob concluded, "entails a special form of commitment
which both holds to the immediacy of a privileged and strange transfor-
mation while insisting on a highly unusual capacity for familiar trans-
formational institutions. '47
Bob attempted, then, to face the question of whether the Messianic (or,
more broadly, eschatological) commitment to "strange transformation"
threatens or consummates the human self-transformative condition. If no-
mos is a world of meaning, does the pressure of the ending deny or distort
that meaning, or in some way realize it? If law is a bridge, why should
we hesitate to cross it?
When I first read Nomos and Narrative, the image of law as a bridge
that must never be crossed (and thereby transcended) recalled for me an
earlier recourse to a bridge as symbol of mythogenesis, of courageous
storytelling amid doubt and despair. In his poem The Bridge, Hart Crane
made use of the bridge as symbolic path between America's past and fu-
ture, which would "Unto us lowliest sometimes sweep, descend / And of
the curveship lend a myth to God."' 4' The myth resided in a balance of
cables and curves whose fragility Crane knew only too well. "Atlan-
tis,-hold thy floating singer late!" the poet exclaimed at the end of the




48. The Bridge, supra note 1, at 46.
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final section of The Bridge,9 but this was not to be; the poet did not long
survive the completion of his poem.
Like any living and effective symbol, the bridge is a sacrament, an ob-
jective correlative or point of contact between the worlds. 50 As a sacra-
ment, the symbol is provisional: an encounter with the Kingdom of God,
from which we re-emerge, changed, to the world that we left behind.
Thus the bridge is not just a symbol selected from a lexicon of symbols for
its special associations and meanings, but a symbol of symbolic meaning as
such. Like marriage, sexual coupling, androgyny, and a few other sym-
bols, the bridge expresses the very meeting of opposites that inheres in
symbolic meaning. 1
In The Bridge, Crane illuminates this generic symbolic meaning by dis-
solving it in a larger symbolism of the dreadful, hopeful contact between
this world and the other. Columbus, beset by doubt, tests his faith in an
interim, mutable, and threatening zone: "For here between two worlds,
another, harsh, / This third, of water, tests the word."52 Sustaining the
navigator through his temptations, through "Invisible valves of the
sea,-locks, tendons / Crested and creeping, troughing corridors / That
fall back yawning to another plunge,""3 is "this crescent ring / Sun-
cusped and zoned with modulated fire / Like pearls that whisper through
the Doge's hands / -Yet no delirium of jewels!"" The crescent ring,
archetype of all bridges, is the rainbow that God set upon the waters of
the Flood as a sign to Noah.
Then God said to Noah and to his sons with him, "Behold, I estab-
lish my covenant with you and your descendents after you, and with
49. Id. at 116.
50. The literature on symbolism is so vast, and the nature of symbolic meaning so contested, that
a separate essay (if not a separate book!) would be required to give a full and explicit account, and
even a moderately perspicuous defense, of the theory of symbols that I bring to my analysis of Bob's
image of law as a bridge. It must suffice here to draw a rather crude distinction between two concep-
tions, not of "what" symbols mean, but of "how" they mean. According to what might be called the
"essentialist" view, symbols simply "have" meanings that rise up from the nature of things. This
view, associated above all with Jung and Eliade, subordinates symbols to a classical naturalism; the
symbols express and participate in the nature of things. I have criticized this view of symbolic mean-
ing in Garet, The Red Bird, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (1985). According to the linguistic or existential-
ist view, which I adopt here, symbols are speech. See P. RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 14
(1967). Ricoeur's maxim in carrying out the interpretation of symbols is "[t]he symbol gives rise to
thought." Id. at 348.
There is no philosophy without presuppositions. A meditation on symbols starts from speech
that has already taken place, and in which everything has already been said in some fashion; it
wishes to be thought with its presuppositions. For it, the first task is not to begin but, from the
midst of speech, to remember; to remember with a view to beginning.
Id. at 348-49.
51. See generally M. ELIADE, THE Two AND THE ONE 78-124 (1979).
52. The Bridge, supra note 1, at 50.
53. Id. at 48.
54. Id. at 50.
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every living creature that is with you. . . .I establish my covenant
with you, that never again shall all flesh be cut off by the waters of a
flood, and never again shall there be a flood to destroy the earth."
And God said, "This is the sign of the covenant which I make be-
tween me and you and every living creature that is with you, for all
future generations: I set my bow in the cloud, and it shall be a sign
of the covenant between me and the earth."5
The rainbow "arc of the covenant" is a prototype of the subsequent cove-
nants that God enters into with the people, and in that sense it is a figure
for Biblical law. It is a law for God: "When the bow is in the clouds, I
will look upon it and remember the everlasting covenant between God and
every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth."56 And it is a law
for humankind, appropriate to our nature: "Whoever sheds the blood of
man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own
image."' 57 It is a message to wanderers that there will come a terminus to
their wanderings, and that what looks from one vantage point like de-
struction looks from a different perspective like a promise of peace and
reunion. Thus the rainbow marries the contraries of life and death, this
world and the other world, the shore of embarcation and the shore at
which the navigator lands, as a true sacrament: "Te Deum laudamus, for
thy teeming span!""8
We learn from Hart Crane's poem that the symbolic function of the
bridge is not so much to represent a certain reality in a figurative or color-
ful way as it is to express longing in a characteristically human way. In
Upon a Dying Lady, Yeats says "When her soul flies to the predestined
dancing-place / (I have no speech but symbol, the pagan speech I made /
Amid the dreams of youth) . . . ."" The poet has no speech but symbol
when she is in the definitively human mode of contemplating death with a
mixture of dread and wonder. Symbolic expression itself is a kind of
dance, and therefore appropriate to the articulation of the soul's
"predestined dancing-place." "And I must borrow every changing shape /
To find expression. . . dance, dance / Like a dancing bear, / Cry like a
parrot, chatter like an ape."'
Symbols are suited to the expression of the losses and limits that bound
experience. In certain symbolist poems, for example, symbols do not so
much describe or denote nature as convey a sense of regret for the loss of
55. Genesis 9:8-13 (Revised Standard Version).
56. Id. 9:16.
57. Id. 9:6.
58. The Bridge, supra note 1, at 51.
59. W.B. YEATS, Upon a Dying Lady, in SELECTED PoEMs AND Two PLAYS OF WILLIAM BUT-
LER YEArs 68 (M. Rosenthal ed. 1966).
60. T.S. ELIOT, Portrait of a Lady, in SELECTED POEMS 21 (1961).
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nature, or a sense of anticipation, bounded by mystery and death, of na-
ture regained. Thus, Yeats believed that symbols possess a special virtue
or power of evoking "the memory of Nature herself" and the "borders of
our mind," shifting borders that may merge into a single "great Mind."6
Symbol is a unit of meaning appropriate to a temporal being who is
aware of its temporality and finds this awareness uncomfortable, trying,
provoking. Hence the famous lines with which Eliot opens The Waste
Land: "April is the cruellest month, breeding / Lilacs out of the dead
land, mixing / Memory and desire, stirring / Dull roots with spring
rain." 2 April is cruel because the birth that it brings is also a reminder of
death. Its cruelty is the cruelty of the symbol, which mixes memory and
desire, the world we have lost with the world we hope to gain. By means
of the symbol, we do not so much represent nature as lament the nature
we have lost, and long for the new nature that we are promised. The
cruelty of the symbol lies in the ultimate identity of the lamentation and
the promise. The arc that God sets as a seal upon the greatest act of
divine destruction is also a promise of new life and redemption.
In calling law a bridge between two worlds, between reality and vision,
Bob deepens our sense of the "nature" in human nature, the nature of
law, and natural law. We have no speech but symbol when the character
of our relation to our future surpasses the semantics of natural representa-
tion. This is not to deny, of course, that images of paradise lost, or of a
new and better paradise-the Kingdom of God, the New Jerusa-
lem-may serve and have served as paradigms or archetypes of the
"earthly city" that we build "here below." Such paradigms or archetypes
may be flatly representational. It is common to look to a holy source, to
Scripture or Constitution, for a blueprint that simply sets out the plans
according to which this civitas terrena can be approximated to the civitas
dei. By attaching law to a symbol, and by making the bridge an exemplar
of that symbol, Bob means to displace this architectural conception of law
with one that takes into account the terrors and temptations "here, be-
tween two worlds," as "another, harsh, / This third, of water, tests the
word."
When employed in a straightforward representational way, the symbol
of law as a bridge between two worlds conveys the idea that we are to
cross from one world to the other, from the actual to the imagined, by
means of law. This interpretation of law as a bridge is consistent with a
familiar view of natural law. On this view, natural law is the higher law,
the model on which we should always seek to build the positive law.
61. W.B. YEATS, Magic, in ESSAYS AND INTRODUCTIONS 28 (1961), quoted in E. WILSON,
AXEL'S CASTLE: A STUDY IN THE IMAGINATIVE LITERATURE OF 1870-1930, at 47-48 (1931).
62. T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in SELECTED POEMS, supra note 60, at 51.
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But Bob does not mean that the bridge is there for the crossing. Instead,
he insists that "law is that which holds our reality apart from our vi-
sions."6' 3 Hence he does not endorse the familar view of natural law as the
model for positive law. His use of a symbol situates law in a different
"naturalism," if that is the proper word to describe what Bob means. He
takes us to be wanderers, navigators in the gap. That is our nature: a
nature best captured in symbolic evocations of memory and desire. Law
that purports to situate us entirely in this world, so that we become so at
home here that we forget our wandering, and law that purports to realize
the Kingdom of God on earth, so that our diaspora is ended forever, alike
distort our human condition.
IV. MEANING AND ENDING
Between the two extremes of utter worldliness and recourse to divine
archetypes as patterns for action in this world, stretch whole realms of
human aspiration. To guide us, we require something more than the sym-
bol of law as a bridge, however evocative it might be, can offer. We need
narrative: "sacred narratives of jurisdiction," "narratives of judicial resis-
tance," "folktales of jurisdiction."
Indeed, for the symbol of law as a bridge to do any work at all, it must
take its place among stories. In discussing the symbol of the bridge in
Crane's poem, for example, I made use of two superimposed stories: the
story of Columbus' discovery of the New World, and the story of the
Flood. The latter, in turn, recalled other stories: God's creation of the
world, God's recreation of the world after the Flood, the divine promise
not to repeat the destruction of the world by water, and the chain of cove-
nants that binds God and people with links of law. In appealing to stories
as a way of making sense out of the symbol of the bridge, I have followed
Bob's principle that the worlds that law bridges "can be represented in
their normative significance only through the devices of narrative," '64 and
that these bridges must themselves be built with "the materials of sacred
narrative.16 5
Why did Bob call his essay Nomos and Narrative, rather than Law as
a Bridge? First, the symbol of the bridge, no matter how embedded it
may be in certain stories, does not do an adequate job of revealing the
connection between law and human nature. Why is law central to our
meaning-creating nature; how does "lawful transformation" differ from or
preside over other transformative aspects of our existence, such as falling
63. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 10 (emphasis added).
64. Id, at 9.
65. Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 182.
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in love, undergoing a religious conversion, making a promise, mounting a
revolution, or becoming pregnant? The bridge symbol fails to answer
these questions. It helps us to see in all of our transformative experiences
an encounter with a gap that fractures our world, but it does not tell us
precisely how law spans that gap.
The second feature of the bridge symbol that renders it inadequate to
Bob's purposes stems from its sacramental character. Even where the
symbol recognizes and insists upon temporality, as in the poems of Yeats
and Eliot to which I have briefly alluded, it conveys its understanding of
temporality in a curiously atemporal way. The images of temporality in
symbolist poetry are, oddly enough, ecstatic, as if the truth about time
could be grasped and expressed only in a compressed image that itself lies
outside of time. In the poems that I have quoted, we do not witness or
reenact the sequence of events in and through which one grows up and
grows old, laments youth and fears death. Instead, we grasp the lamenta-
tion and the fear, as well as the joy and anticipation that memory and
desire may bring, in sharp and beautiful moments of understanding. The
union effected by the understanding draws temporality's sting. Hence it is
tempting to say that symbolism misunderstands what it conveys, or that
we misunderstand ourselves when our understanding is symbolic.
Narrative, by contrast, always inhabits a temporal world in which
things happen before and after one another, because of one another. Even
narratives rich in symbols, such as fairy tales or certain legends, rely upon
a sense of temporal succession or progression. 6 Upon encountering a sym-
bol, one asks "What does the symbol mean?"; but upon hearing a story,
one asks "What happens next?" Hence narrative and symbol convey dif-
ferent senses of ourselves. What we understand of ourselves when we tell
stories about ourselves is different from what we understand of ourselves
when we speak in symbols, as we do when we write or read symbolist
poetry.6 7 If I am correct in regarding the recourse to narrative as a re-
66. Tzvetan Todorov draws a distinction between the "narrative of contiguity" and the "narrative
of substitutions." Only in stories of the first type, according to Todorov, is the reader's interest driven
by the question, "What happens next?" In stories of the second type, the reader's interest is in the
meaning of a central symbol. T. TODOROV, THE POETICS OF PROSE 135 (1977). While Todorov's
presentation of this distinction is helpful, it obscures the fact that for a "narrative of substitutions" to
count precisely as a narrative, rather than as the simple invocation of a symbol ("water," "blue,"
"the red bird," etc.), it must depend to some extent upon the temporal contiguity of events. Through-
out this essay, I do not mean to deny that most symbols work their meanings through stories, and that
most stories achieve their meanings through the use of symbols. I suggest only that as pure types of
meaning, symbolic meaning does not rely upon temporal contiguity, and narrative meaning does not
depend upon symbolic substitution.
67. The way in which symbols give meaning, and the weight of claims sometimes made on behalf
of the normative or guiding power of symbols, no doubt depend in large measure upon the genre of
expression in which the symbols do their work. Whatever may be said of the meaning and authority
of symbols that appear in dreams, or in ritual, it does not seem to me that symbols in so-called
"symbolist poetry" function as nature's message-bearers. Reading such poetic symbols as logos, not
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formed naturalism, then there must be some unique and valuable way in
which narrative can illuminate our human nature. More than anyone
else, Paul Ricoeur, in The Symbolism of Evil,68 has explored the special
contributions of narrative to the understanding of human nature. Ricoeur
identifies three ways in which the narratives that concern him, myths of
the origin and meaning of evil, contribute to human self-understanding.
Ricoeur's ideas are so helpful, and so close to the heart of what I take to
be Bob's project, that they must be quoted at some length.
1. The first function of the myths of evil is to embrace mankind
as a whole in one ideal history. By means of a time that represents
all times, "man" is manifested as a concrete universal . . . [and] ex-
perience is put on the track of existential structures: one can now say
man, existence, human being, because in the myth the human type is
recapitulated, summed up.
2. The universality, of man, manifested through the myths, gets
its concrete character from the movement which is introduced into
human experience by narration; in recounting the Beginning and the
End of fault, the myth confers upon this experience an orientation, a
character, a tension ....
3. Still more fundamentally, the myth tries to get at the enigma
of human existence, namely, the discordance between the fundamen-
tal reality-state of innocence, status of a creature, essential be-
ing-and the actual modality of man, as defiled, sinful, guilty. The
myth accounts for this transition by means of a narration. But it is a
narration precisely because there is no deduction, no logical transi-
tion, between the fundamental reality of man and his present exis-
tence, between his ontological status as a being created good and des-
tined for happiness and his existential or historical status,
experienced under the sign of alienation. Thus the myth has an
ontological bearing: it points to the relation-that is to say, both the
leap and the passage, the cut and the suture-between the essential
being of man and his historical existence. 9
The first two points culminate in the third, to which I will restrict my
attention here. Narrative naturalism differs from other forms of ethical
and philosophical naturalism in two related ways. First, there is no rela-
tion of logical entailment between nature and existence. The relation be-
tween what we are by nature, and the life-situation in which we find
ourselves, can be articulated only in the form of story, and not in the form
mana, see P. RICOEUR, supra note 50, at 14, renders them more closely analogous to the reading of
law, see White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, 82 MIcH. L.
REv. 1669 (1984).
68. P. RICOEUR, supra note 50.
69. Id. at 162-63.
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of a syllogism. Second, that relation, even as conceived and expressed in
narrative, never becomes a simple identity. Narrative makes neither the
essentialist assertion that we are what we are, nor the existentialist asser-
tion that we are not what we are. Instead, the relation is "both the leap
and the passage, the cut and the suture." It is, in short, the bridge that
spans the gap, but is never finally crossed.70
Nevertheless, there is nothing inherent in narrative that specifically
identifies the kinds of transformations or successions that are to count as
law. Like symbol, narrative is generally fungible for all transformations; it
does not reveal anything that is distinctive of "the nature of law." If Bob
is to ground his "natural law of jurisdiction" on narratives, then, he must
have some independent criterion that identifies those stories that count as
law-stories. Bob does not discuss this criterion. But the stories that he tells
in his later essays are primarily about people whom we would identify as
judges and lawyers. Therefore Bob must already know which stories are
law-stories, so that he can tell just those stories that are to "ground judi-
cial commitments."
Telling law-stories teaches us something important about life in the
gap, and about the ethical character of our meaning-creative nature. We
learn of a hard road that spans the gap; harder than mystical union,
harder than pure violence. Both of the latter routes to transformation-to
remaking our present lives in the image of God's Kingdom-deny the
terms of the gap. Ethical life that accepts those terms-ethical life in the
nomos-is always ready to accept, though perhaps less ready to inflict,
suffering and death: tokens of the fracture that lies between the actual and
the ideal. 7
The only way to take the transformational conception of human nature
seriously, and the only way to take law seriously, is to take them together.
His study of anti-slavery jurisprudence taught Bob to be wary of pro-
fessed redemptionists or utopians, such as the Garrisonians, who with-
drew into the insular purity of their convictions. These insular trans-
formationists-who exemplify Troeltsch's "sect type"' 2-retire like a deus
70. To recover the image of naturalism as spanning a gap, we must look behind the recent discus-
sions of the "naturalistic fallacy," see, e.g., Searle, How to Derive "Ought"from "Is," in THEORIES
OF ETHICS 101-14 (P. Foot ed. 1967) (other essays in collection also noteworthy), to the famous
"ditch" that preoccupied the eighteenth-century "Wolfenbfittel fragmentist," Gotthold Lessing. Les-
sing asserted that "accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of
reason." G. LESSING, On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power, in LESSING'S THEOLOGICAL WRrr-
INGS 53 (1956) (emphasis omitted). The historical evidence of Christ's life and teaching, no matter
how abundant and reliable, can never prove the identity of Christ. "That, then, is the ugly, broad
ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap."
Id. at 55.
71. See Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 46-53; Violence and the Word, supra note 3, at
1604-09.
72. See 2 E. TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 691-94
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absconditus from jurisgenesis. "The Garrisonian move, like that of reli-
gious sectarians, was a move toward nomian insularity-the rejection of
participation in the creation of a general and public nomos. . . . By de-
marcating reality, perfectionist Garrisonian norms necessarily gave up any
emphasis on the process of transformation itself."
7 3
Bob contrasted the insular Garrisonians to "radical constitutionalists"
such as Frederick Douglass, who argued that
the Constitution of the United States-inaugurated to "form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty"-could not well have been designed at the same
time to maintain and perpetuate a system of rapine and murder like
slavery. .... 74
Unlike the Garrisonians, Bob argued, Douglass' radical constitutionalists
took their redemptionism seriously, because they took law seriously "by
embracing a vision-a vision of an alternative world in which the entire
order of American slavery would be without foundation in law."
'7 5
Judges face the same choice that confronts redemptionist social move-
ments. "With respect to a world of redemptive constitutionalism, the
Court must either deny the redemptionists the power of the state (and
thereby either truncate the growth of their law or force them into resis-
tance) or share their interpretation. 71 6 Whichever way the Court chooses,
however-whether it takes or declines jurisdiction-judges "cannot avoid
responsibility for applying or refusing to apply power to fulfill a redemp-
tionist vision."'7 7 Even a refusal to take jurisdiction, in fact, is transforma-
tive: "The worlds of law we create are all, in part, redemptive."7'8 None-
theless, the world of law, or nomos, is starved of meaning, and loses the
capacity to justify its exercise of violence, when it sharply distinguishes
itself from the transformative hopes of the potentially law-making or
jurisgenerative groups.79 "Legal meaning is a challenging enrichment of
(1960).
73. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 36-37.
74. Id. at 38 (quoting F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 261-62 (R.
Logan ed. 1967)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Does the "natural law of jurisdiction" justify law's recourse to violence? Perhaps the term
"justify" is too strong. See Violence and the Word, supra note 3, at 1610. Yet a natural law theory
should do more than supply reminders of the virtues of modesty and daring that are relevant to the
making of every decision about the use of violent means.
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social life, a potential restraint on arbitrary power and violence. We ought
to stop circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new worlds."80
Bob's commitment to these views led him to a profound ambivalence
about apocalyptic or messianic movements, especially those of the radical
constitutionalist sort. On the one hand, he admired them for having the
courage of their convictions: for commending their redemptive, world-
transforming vision to the nomos, and, insofar as the nomos failed to ac-
commodate that vision, for engaging in committed and serious civil disobe-
dience. On the other hand, he regarded the belief, common to apocalyptic
or messianic movements, that the Kingdom of God can be realized on
earth, as a denial of the role of law in the transformative struggles defini-
tive of human life.8 L
Thus, in work that he had not completed at the time of his death, Bob
chose to analyze closely the attempt by the rabbis of sixteenth-century
Safed to renew semikhah, or authoritative rabbinic ordination, and with it
to renew the full criminal jurisdiction of the rabbinic courts. The rabbis
who sought to renew semikhah hoped thereby to meet what they took to
be a condition precedent to the coming of the Messiah. 2
It would seem that the messianic rabbis of Safed share much with the
radical constitutionalists whom Bob admired. Both groups dared to try to
bring about a transformation of the world; both groups offered up that
enterprise to the nomos, preferring the more difficult road that takes law
seriously to the easier road of insularity or sectarian withdrawal. More-
over, the rabbis of Safed, as judges who made bold to extend their juris-
diction in the face of a contrary orthodoxy, were heroes in the tradition of
the "tales of jurisdiction," stories that remind us of the courageous acts of
judges who sought to curtail the misdeeds of kings and presidents . 3
Yet Bob could not forgive the rabbis of Safed for crossing the bridge, for
80. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 68.
81. In this respect, Bob's views bear comparison with those of Reinhold Niebuhr. With Niebuhr,
but contrary to most other thinkers who have had some faith in the idea of natural law, Bob thought
that the ethics of the Kingdom of God are not a blueprint for the building of a better world, but a
safeguard against the collapse of justice into something infinitely worse. The point of appealing to
God and Nature, for Bob, was not to bring an earthly paradise of love and mutuality, but to prevent
Captain Vere and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw from punishing the innocent in the name of justice.
Compare JuSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 8, at 1-7 with R. NIEBUHR, LOVE AND JUSTICE: SELEC-
TIONS FROM THE SHORTER WRITINGS OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR 28 (1967) ("without the 'grace' of
love, justice always degenerates into something less than justice"). See also R. NIEBUHR, The Rele-
vance of an Impossible Ethical Ideal, in AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN ETmICS 103-35
(1935); G. OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS 172-74 (1972) (placing Niebuhr's ethics in con-
text of his anthropology and eschatology).
82. The account that Bob gives of the Safed events in Messiah, supra note 23, is basically the
same account that he published in Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 190-97. Bob also made that
account the basis for his essay, A Translation of Kunteres Ha's'mihah: A Dispute That Occurred
Between the Sages of Safed and the Sages of Jerusalem Over the Issue of S'mihah (Sept. 23, 1985)
(unpublished manuscript).
83. See Folktales of Justice, supra note 2, at 183-90.
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offering to put an end once and for all to the "tension between reality and
vision."84 The rabbis of Safed failed to understand that law is a device for
warding off the Messiah, not a device for bringing him.
It is instructive to compare Bob's commitment to law as a device for
warding off the Messiah, with the Grand Inquisitor's refusal to admit the
returned Christ.85 Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor defended church law
against Christ's return because he saw that people are too stupid, too
weak, and too needy to accept Christ's message, with the transformative
demands it makes upon the totality of the spiritual life. The Grand In-
quisitor condemns Christ on behalf of humanity, in the name of limited
human nature. Bob, like the Grand Inquisitor, would turn away the Mes-
siah, but for the opposite reasons. Those who would bring the Messiah
through law misconceive our human nature by failing to recognize that we
are beings whose nature it is to "inhabit a nomos."8' Ours is a world of
tension between reality and vision, not a world in which the vision and
the reality merge. Thus Bob would hold us to our definitive life of self-
transformative struggle, a life which takes itself most seriously in moments
of jurisgenesis that entail obedient and disobedient commitment. In short,
Bob would hold off the Messiah in the name of our freedom, while the
Grand Inquisitor would hold off the Messiah because we are unfit for
freedom.
"Law is a resource in signification,"8" a constituent of the meaning-
creative process of life. Narrative reminds us of this tie between law and
our meaning-creative nature. "In this normative world, law and narrative
are inseparably related."88 Those who would bring the Messiah through
law misunderstand law and human nature. The pressure of the ending
threatens the vitality and authenticity of meaning. We may say of apo-
calypts and millenarists intoxicated with a sense of the ending of all
things, what Weber said of inner-worldly ascetics: They are "afflicted
with a sort of happy stupidity regarding any question about the meaning
of the world." '89 Yet such a "happy stupidity toward meaning" is itself, of
course, a kind of meaning, in the same way that "a great disorder is an
order."90 In their readiness to subject the central institutions of their lives
to the discipline of the Messiah, the rabbis of Safed no doubt understood
themselves to be realizing, not abrogating, the meanings of their lives and
of the work that filled those lives. Moreover, it is far from clear that their
84. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
85. F. DosToYEvsKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 288-311 (D. Magarshack trans. 1958).
86. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 9, at 4.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 5.
89. M. WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 173 (1963).
90. See supra note 27.
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effort to renew semikhah was fated in some essential way to condemn or
destroy the meaning-generative character of their legal scholarship and
their adjudication of issues in Jewish law. If the attempt to renew
semikhah had not met fatal opposition at the hands of the rabbis of Jeru-
salem, would the tensely equipoised bridge of law and meaning in Safed
have crumbled into something inhuman, unlawful, and meaningless?
I am sure that Bob must have confronted this question. Indeed, I be-
lieve it was one of the central interests that moved him to study the Safed
episode. I do not know what answer he might have given. Perhaps, in
acknowledging the "obvious fallacies" in his earlier belief that "the imme-
diacy of the end of days [like Revolutionary transformations]" must "inev-
itably . . . tend to undermine the 'normal' tension between present and
future," Bob meant to back away from his earlier claim that the pressure
of imminent ending robs the spirit of legal meaning. 1
A second difficulty creeps closer to the heart of Bob's enterprise. The
narrative form establishes its own relation between meaning and ending,9 2
a relation that may distinguish narrative from the logic of both life and
law. The semantic world of narrative is a relation between meaning and
ending such that the ending, far from threatening the meaning of what
has gone before, renders that meaning possible, and thereby fulfils its
promise.
Nietzsche's aphorism about "end and goal" may clarify this point. "Not
every end is the goal. The end of a melody is not its goal; and yet: as long
as the melody has not reached its end, it also hasn't reached its goal. A
parable."9 The end of the melody completes it; without the ending, the
melody is incomplete. Nonetheless, the goal of the melody is not to be
completed, but perhaps to delight us, or to put us into a reverie. By con-
trast, the ending of the story completes not only the story, but its meaning.
A melody is what it is until it ends; but what a story means pivots on how
the story ends. Hence, for narrative, the cruelty of the ending-the fact
that the ending sets a term to the story, brings it to a close-is redeemed
by the breath of life that the ending breathes into the story's meaning. In
"breeding/Lilacs out of the dead land," endings achieve a kind of rebirth.
It is no accident, then, that scenes of self-transformation, of regenera-
tion, of what Kierkegaard called "the qualitative leap,"9 provide the end-
91. Messiah, supra note 23 (brackets in original).
92. On the endings of narratives, see F. KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING (1967), and the
very thoughtful comparative and typological study, M. TORGOVNICK, CLOSURE IN THE NOVEL
(1981).
93. F. NIETZSCHE, Appendix: Seventy-Five Aphorisms from Five Volumes, in ON THE GENEAL-
OGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HoMo 183 (N. Kaufman & R. Hollingdale trans. 1969).
94. See, e.g., S. KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF DREAD 82 (W. Lowrie trans. 1944); S.
KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, 94, 343 (D. Swenson & W. Lowrie trans.
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ing of stories which never fail to impress upon us the most serious and
lasting insights into human life. So Tolstoy, in Master and Man, ends the
story with Vasili Brekhunov's act of self-sacrificing love for his man, Nik-
ita: The life of the master is given for the life of the man. "Nikita is alive,
so I too am alive!" the dying master says to himself, in joyful triumph.
And he remembered his money, his shop, his house, the buying and
selling . . . and it was hard for him to understand why that man,
called Vasili Brekhunov, had troubled himself with all those things
with which he had been troubled.
"Well, it was because he did not know what the real thing was,"
he thought, concerning that Vasili Brekhunov. "He did not know,
but now I know and know for sure. Now I know!"19 5
Likewise Raskolnikov, in Crime and Punishment, from the exile of his
punishment, experiences "a full resurrection into a new life." "He did not
know," Dostoyevsky concludes,
that the new life would not be given him for nothing, that he would
have to pay dearly for it, that it would cost him great striving, great
suffering.
But that is the beginning of a new story-the story of the gradual
renewal of a man, the story of his gradual regeneration, of his pass-
ing from one world into another, of his initiation into a new un-
known life. That might be the subject of a new story, but our present
story is ended. 8
Thus the ending of one story is the beginning of another; the death of the
master is the life of the man. This is the relation between meaning and
ending in narrative: that the ending makes the meaning possible, while
the meaning makes the ending no ending at all, but instead a beginning.
Given the importance we assign to stories, the role they have always
played in our efforts to understand ourselves, we can say with some assur-
ance that we will not understand human self-transformability, as opposed
to buying, selling, and the other things that trouble us, if we do not listen
carefully to the great stories. But our dependence upon narratives of
transformation does not flow exclusively, or even primarily, from the con-
tingent messages that literature sends. In some sense, the very intuition of
self-transformation as a human possibility is a residue of storytelling, a
product of the narrative relation between meaning and ending. Regenera-
1941).
95. L. TolsToy, Master and Man, in THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND OTHER STORIES 290
(1960).
96. F. DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 575-76 (C. Garnet trans. 1959).
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tion or rebirth, on this view, is not just a lesson that some stories teach,
but a semantic structure of stories as such, derived from the symbiosis in
which meaning draws from ending its sting of finality.
We can learn from narrative, however, only what narrative is equipped
to teach."' Lives, of course, are not stories, and the relation between
meaning and ending is not the same for lives as it is for stories. No doubt
it would be a mistake to declare, with the existentialists, that the relation
is in fact reversed: that in life the ending negates meaning, while in story
ending makes meaning possible. There is no reversal, there is only differ-
ence. Since life is not a story, its ending cannot redeem itself by comple-
tion of meaning. Hence we are caught by literature in a distinctive way.
Literature bids us expect from life the redemption that is characteristic of
the story form, but literature cannot make good on that expectation. In-
stead of disappointment, however, we find in this limitation a peculiar
kind of excitement. We turn to philosophy for a conception of human
nature as self-transformability, and thereby hope to answer the call that
came forth from narrative.
When philosophy answers that call, it teaches us to see the redemption
and regeneration of life within life. Having no ending to redeem us, we
make our renewing stories for ourselves, from the transforming events of
our lives: from the exchange of wedding vows, from the experience of
pregnancy and childbearing, from conversion and disillusionment, from
vocational and political commitment. We celebrate repentence and forgive-
ness, maturation and resignation. Life redeems the promise of literature
when disobedient suffering transforms the conditions of war or oppression,
or when a woman in the courage of her struggle breaks the limits that had
been placed upon her life; or when death teaches life
Migrations that must needs void memory,
Inventions that cobblestone the heart,-
Unspeakable Thou Bridge to Thee, 0 Love.98
97. For discussion of the limits upon narrative as a source of moral instruction or guidance, see
Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 35, 120-34 (1985).
98. The Bridge, supra note 1, at 116.
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